







No	 scholar,	 policy-maker	 or	 practitioner	 of	 policing	 could	 be	 taken	 seriously	 who	 did	 not	
acknowledge	 and	 take	 into	 account	 the	 radical	 transformation	 which	 privatization	 and	
pluralisation	has	brought	to	the	field	of	policing	(Jones	&	Newburn,	2006).	Nevertheless,	this	
transformation	 is	 largely	 influenced	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 policing	 tradition	 in	 each	 nation	
state.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 argument	a	descriptive	analysis	of	plural	policing	 in	 the	metropolis	
Paris	is	presented.	Being	part	of	the	Napoleonic	policing	tradition	in	France,	Paris	takes	up	a	
unique	political	and	administrative	position	which	affects	its	security	architecture.	It	stands	
out	 as	 the	 most	 developed	 example	 of	 centralisation	 and	 the	 State’s	 wish	 to	 control	 its	
citizens.	Despite	the	observed	pluralisation	in	terms	of	privatization;	Paris	is	still	a	‘state’	in	
the	 state.	 Its	 Napoleonic	 tradition	 largely	 ‘suppresses’	 civil	 non-commercial	 initiatives	 and	
















which	 are	 interrelated:	 plural	 policing	 and	 citizen	 participation.	 Plural	 policing	 refers	 to	
different	actors	(such	as	the	army,	private	security	companies,	other	regulatory	authorities,	
volunteers	 and	 citizens)	 being	 involved	 in	 policing.	 Crucial	 in	 this	 process	 is	 the	 changing	
power	 balance	 between	 government,	 the	 public	 police	 and	 these	 other	 security	 actors	
(Bayley	 &	 Shearing,	 1996;	 Crawford	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Jones	 &	 Newburn,	 2006).	 Although	 the	
modernity	of	the	concept	of	plural	policing	has	been	relativized	(Zedner,	2006),	in	relation	to	
citizen	 participation	 it	 is	 a	 challenge	 for	 each	 nation	 state.	 It	 touches	 the	 power	 relation	
between	citizens	and	the	state,	which	is	rooted	in	the	national	police	traditions.	It	brings	up	
the	discussion	about	which	role	the	state	can	play	for	citizens	who	want	to	take	initiative	or	
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Nevertheless,	 it	 should	be	noted	that	one	of	 the	authors	can	rely	on	empirical	 research	 in	








in	 Paris.	 In	 a	 fourth	 part	 we	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 position	 of	 private	 commercial	 security	





Paris	 is	 a	 French	 commune	 (town)	 covering	 105	 km²,	 with	 a	 population	 of	 2.249	 million	
inhabitants	 in	 20113,	 headed	 by	 a	 city	 Mayor	 and	 20	 district	 Mayors	 (districts,	 or	
arrondissements,	 vary	 considerably	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 area	 and	 population).	 The	Mayor	 is	
elected	 by	 the	 council	 of	 Paris,	 which	 is	 elected	 by	 the	 citizens4.	 The	 greater	 Paris	
metropolitan	area	 is	much	more	of	 a	 ‘mixed	bag’,	 comprising	of	 10.1	million	 inhabitants5,	
396	towns	of	all	sizes,	each	headed	by	their	own	mayor	with	their	own	authority	and	duties	
in	matters	of	 security.	Socio-demographics	differ	greatly	 in	Paris.	 For	example,	 in	 terms	of	
per	capita	income,	Neuilly-sur-Seine	(population	of	61.2006)	is	a	far	cry	from	Clichy-sous-Bois	
(population	 of	 30.0007),	 where	 the	 2005	 riots	 originated,	 with	 a	 net	 annual	 household	
income	of	83	835€	versus	15	314€8	respectively.	In	fact,	these	396	communes	seem	to	have	
very	 little	 common	 ground	 in	 terms	 of	 wealth,	 size,	 or	 political	 beliefs.	 In	 terms	 of	
organisational	 structure,	 the	 city	 of	 Paris	 must	 be	 distinguished	 from	 the	 three	 adjacent,	
surrounding,	 100%	 built-up	 ‘départements’	 that	 comprise	 the	 so-called	 ‘petite	 couronne’,	
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and	the	four,	larger	‘départements’	dubbed	‘grande	couronne’,	which	are	undergoing	a	fast	
urbanisation	 process.	 This	 whole	 group	 makes	 up	 the	 ‘Ile-de-France	 région’	 with	 a	
population	of	11.74	million	and	a	geographical	size	of	12	000	km².		
	
Nowadays,	 besides	 security	 people	 are	 worried	 about	 economics.	 A	 recent	 survey	 (2013)	
shows	that	the	main	concerns	of	people	living	in	Paris	are	unemployment	(56,5%),	poverty	
(26,0%)	and	crime	(13,7%)9.	15,2%	of	them	(in	comparison	to	18,5%	living	in	the	banlieues)	
feel	 that	 “crime	 is	 a	 priority	 for	 the	 government”.	 Victimization	 surveys	 show	 that	 people	













separation	between	 the	periphery	 and	downtown.	 This	 line	 separating	 the	 city	 itself	 from	
the	suburbs	used	to	be	 in	 the	 form	of	actual	walls.	Today	the	physical	separation	 is	 in	 the	
shape	 of	 the	 ‘boulevard	 périphérique’,	 a	 six-lane	 freeway	 which	 surrounds	 the	 capital.	
Furthermore,	administrative	borders	exist	 in	Paris.	The	city	of	Paris,	enjoying	an	extremely	
peculiar	 status,	 is	 itself	 a	 ‘département’,	 distinct	 from	 the	 surrounding	 ‘petite	 couronne’	
ones	 (Hauts-de-Seine,	 Val-de-Marne	 and	 Seine-Saint-Denis).	 Traditionally,	 suburbs	 used	 to	
be	 where	 unwanted	 populations	 were	 relegated	 (Chevallier,	 1958;	 Merriman,	 1994).	
Throughout	the	19th	century,	new	industries	built	their	facilities	in	the	so-called	‘banlieues’	





Today,	 rightly	 or	 wrongly,	 the	 children	 and	 grand-children	 of	 these	 immigrants	 (of	 north-
African	 and	 sub-Saharan	 extraction	mainly)	 lay	 at	 the	 centre	 of	modern	 fears	 (Mucchielli,	
2002).	 To	 be	 more	 precise,	 the	 Parisians’	 vision	 is	 still	 shaped	 around	 the	 idea	 of	 two	
conflicting	worlds	:	the	civilised,	pacified	city	world	versus	the	‘banlieue’,	an	unruly	place	of	
disorder	and	confrontation	with	police	forces,	filled	with	idle	youths	‘holding	up	the	walls’.	In	
colloquial	 French,	 this	 phase	 –	 tenir	 les	 murs	 –	 refers	 to	 young	 people	 hanging	 out	
unproductively	 and	 typically	 leaning	 up	 against	 the	 walls	 and	 making	 a	 living	 out	 of	
trafficking	drugs,	stolen	goods,	stripped-down	or	even	burned-out	cars	(Kokoreff,	2007).	The	
October-November	 2005	 riots	 have	 but	 reinforced	 this	 view.	 Beyond	 the	 ‘périphérique’	 is	
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vertical	 when	 poorer	 people	 had	 to	 live	 in	 harder-to-access	 upper	 floors,	 turned	 into	
horizontal	space	segregation	from	19th	century	onwards,	owing	to	technical	advances	such	
as	elevators	(Pinol,	2003).	Neighbourhoods	within	Paris	then	tended	to	‘specialise’	socially.	
Western	 Paris,	more	 upper	 class	 and	wealthier,	 differs	 from	 the	 eastern	 part	 of	 the	 city,	
which	 is	 traditionally	more	working	 class	 and	poorer.	While	 gentrification	 is	undeniably	 at	
work	in	eastern	Paris	these	days,	low-income	households	remain,	especially	in	north-eastern	
arrondissements	 where	 cheap	 social	 housing	 is	 still	 available	 (Pinçon	 &	 Pinçon	 Charlot,	
2004).	An	administrative	euphemism	to	designate	rough	urban	areas	within	Paris	are	the	so-
called	 ‘zones	 urbaines	 sensibles’	 [ZUS].	 These	 zones	 display	 similar	 characteristics	 as	
suburban	 areas	 such	 as	 social	 housing	 with	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	 immigrants,	 high	




Nevertheless,	 considering	 Paris’	 banlieues	 under	 the	 prism	 of	 poverty	 alone	 would	 be	
extremely	 simplistic.	 Again,	 drawing	 an	 East-West	 dividing	 line	 is	 a	 relevant	 simplification.	






generated	 by	 this	 situation.	 On	 a	 daily	 basis	 Paris	 attracts	 numerous	 workers	 from	 all	
adjacent	regions.	As	a	European	metropolis	it	is	swarming	with	tourists.	Furthermore	Paris	is	
home	 to	 5,200	 celebrations,	 sports	 events,	 inaugurations,	 and	 ceremonies	 yearly11.	 The	
dense	public	 transportation	network,	added	 to	 the	 relative	proximity	of	 central	Paris	 from	
rough	suburban	areas,	leads	young	people	from	the	latter	(‘les	jeunes	des	quartiers’	as	they	
are	 called)	 to	 go	 to	 Paris	 in	 order	 to	 party,	 or	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 many	 events	
happening	there.	The	central	area	of	Les	Halles,	a	transportation	hub	where	many	subway	
and	train	lines	converge,	is	particularly	spectacular	in	this	respect,	but	other	places	are	just	
as	 crowded	 on	 occasion.	 Demonstrations	 of	 all	 kinds	 (industrial	 workers,	 farmers,	 civil	
servants	etc.)	are	frequent	in	Paris.		
These	 kind	 of	 flows	 are	 one	 of	 the	 main	 security	 challenges	 for	 the	 police.	 One	
characterization	of	the	public	demand,	at	 least	 its	understanding	by	the	police	forces,	 is	to	
preserve	the	 invisible	borders	between	the	different	areas	 (Donzelot,	2008).	A	“small”	 riot	
with	 people	 from	 ethnic	minorities	 in	 a	 rich	 area	 in	 the	western	 part	 of	 the	 city	 (like	 for	
example	on	the	14th	of	May	2013	in	the	Trocadero,	in	front	of	the	Tour	Eiffel)	is	unbearable	
for	 the	 inhabitants	 and	 for	 the	 police	 authorities.	 Groups	 of	 youngsters	 leaning	 up	 are	
tolerated	 only	 in	 “their”	 areas	 but	 under	 the	 pressure	 of	 police	 forces	 if	 they	 enter	 rich	
preserved	 zones	 (Mouhanna,	 2002).	 It	 reinforces	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 main	 concern	 of	 the	
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of	 territories,	 essentially	 distributed	 along	 the	 East-West	 and	 centre-periphery	 axes	
described	 above,	 each	 with	 its	 own	 security	 issues.	 The	 first	 type	 are	 relatively	 quiet	





vital	 underground	 economy	 to	 sustain	 a	 marginally	 decent	 way	 of	 life.	 The	 figure	 of	 the	
‘young’	male	 immigrant	seems	to	crystallise	all	 fears.	A	 fourth	type	could	be	added.	These	
are	changing	areas	due	to	gentrification.	Their	status	is	rapidly	shifting	from	underprivileged	
neighbourhood	 with	 rather	 old	 buildings,	 to	 that	 of	 a	 ‘hype’	 area,	 before	 ultimately	
becoming	yet	another	residential	or	tourist	district.	
	
Obviously,	 security	 and	 feelings	 of	 insecurity	 vary	 considerably	 according	 to	 the	 area	
mentioned	above.	‘Rough	areas’	tend	to	be	those	with	the	most	problems	as	far	as	security,	
poverty	and	unemployment	are	concerned.	They	also	suffer	from	bad	relationships	between	
police	 officers	 and	 the	 local	 population.	 They	 are	 an	 extreme	 example	 of	 the	 systemic	
difficulties	 encountered	 in	 French	police	propensity	 to	 act.	 In	 other	words,	while	 they	 are	
plagued	 with	 the	 most	 hardships,	 yet	 they	 do	 not	 enjoy	 an	 adequate	 policing	 response.	
42,5%	of	 people	 living	 in	 the	 banlieues	 (in	 comparison	 to	 32,4%	of	 the	 Parisians)	 indicate	
that	 there	 are	not	 enough	police	 forces	 in	 their	 district12.	 This	 lack	of	 appropriate	 answer	
from	 police	 forces	 can	 also	 be	 felt,	 in	 a	 more	 mitigated	 way,	 in	 other	 types	 of	 areas.	




to	 35,16/1000	 inhabitants),	 crime	 against	 persons	 (17,5	 to	 7,52/1000	 inhabitants)	 and	
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l’enquête de 2011 
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Within	 Paris15	 the	 official	 police	 to	 population	 ratio	 is	 201	 persons	 per	 police	 officer,	
compounded	by	 the	 fact	 that	many	 law	enforcement	units	are	based	 in	Paris.	 These	units	
add	up	to	about	13,000	Riot	Control	Forces	(CRS,	Compagnies	Républicaines	de	Sécurité),16	
and	 17,000	 gendarmes17	 which	 are	 stationed	 all	 over	 the	 French	 territory	 but	 never	
intervene	 in	 their	 own	district.	 According	 to	 a	 long-established	principle	 these	 forces	 deal	
only	 with	 geographically	 distant	 problems	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 any	 issues	 stemming	 from	
potential	 closeness	 with	 demonstrators.	 Hence,	 many	 of	 these	 gendarmes	 and	 public	
security	police	often	stay	in	Paris,	spending	a	few	weeks	there	before	coming	back	to	their	
unit.	They	supplement	the	permanent	staff	of	police	stations.	Their	presence	illustrates	the	
main	 priority	 of	 the	 police	 forces:	 to	 preserve	 order,	 to	 fight	 against	 demonstrators	 and	
rioters.	 It	has	 to	be	noticed	 that	not	only	 these	 specialists	 are	embedded	 in	 this	 issue.	All	
police	forces	in	Paris,	including	the	local	police	stations,	are	involved	in	this	fight.	They	spend	
















and	strategic	decisions	are	made	at	bureaucratic	 level.	 In	Paris,	police	bureaucracy	 is	both	












conclusions.	 Firstly,	 Paris	 did	 not	 have	 a	 mayor	 at	 all	 from	 1794	 to	 February	 1848,	 from	
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17 Source:  Gendarmerie nationale. The National Gendarmerie is a military institution in charge of public safety 





control	 of	 demonstrations.	 This	 prompted	most	 experts	 (Monjardet,	 1996)	 to	believe	 that	







Given	 its	 political,	 economic	 and	 demographic	 prominence,	 the	 Paris	 metropolitan	 area	
stands	 quite	 apart	 in	 the	 country.	 Paradoxes	 can	 be	 found	 all	 over	 the	 city.	 The	 greatest	
concentration	 of	 wealth	 lies	 right	 next	 to	 the	 largest	 underprivileged	 population.	 Upscale	








Those	 various	 economic	 and	 geographic	 paradoxes	 entail	 very	 complex	 political	 and	
administrative	 organisational	 issues.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Mayor	 of	 Paris	 (the	 largest	 city	 in	




of	prerogatives	 that	 in	other	 cities	belong	 to	 the	mayor,	 such	as	 security,	 road	 safety	and	
maintenance,	 street	 sweeping,	 or	 peace	 and	 quiet.	 It	 also	 somewhat	 eats	 into	 the	







help	 but	 get	 thoroughly	 involved	 in	 security	 issues.	 This	 has	 been	 an	 ongoing	 concern	 in	
French	politics	for	the	last	thirty	years	at	least,	both	locally	and	nationally.	While	the	various	










within	 the	State’,	 insofar	as	 its	 leadership	has	considerable	means	and	staff	at	 its	disposal	




de	Police,	which	was	 the	model	 for	 the	national	 police	 force	 in	 July	 1941.	Until	 1966,	 the	
Paris	 police	 department	 enjoyed	 special	 status	 within	 the	 national	 police	 as	 it	 had	 for	
instance	in-house	staff	management	rules.	While	this	is	not	the	case	anymore,	the	Prefect	of	
Police	 undeniably	 remains	 an	 autonomous	 and	 powerful	 character,	 in	 practice	 largely	
independent	from	the	Ministry	of	Interior.		
	
Headquartered	 in	 the	 Ile	de	 la	Cité,	at	 the	heart	of	Paris,	a	 traditional	place	of	power,	 the	




being	 comfortably	 staffed	 and	 endowed.	 For	 example	 the	 criminal	 police	 for	 the	 Paris	
metropolitan	 area	 does	 reflect	 its	 special	 status	 as	 it	 includes	 84	 (out	 of	 303)	
superintendents	 (Commissaires	de	Police	 Judiciaire),	1,142	 (out	of	2,956)	officers	 (Officiers	
de	Police	Judiciaire)	and	717	(out	of	1,76918)	rank	and	file	(Gardiens	de	Police	Judiciaire)	.The	







policies	 with	 the	 Prefect.	 As	 a	 result,	 his	 position	 is	 lopsided.	 The	Mayor	 of	 Paris,	 whose	






in	 the	 surrounding	 ‘petite	 couronne’	 départements,	 only	 the	 Criminal	 Police	 Force	 (Police	
Judiciaire,	 part	 of	 the	 National	 Police)	 and	 fire	 fighters	 report	 to	 him.	 The	 public	 security	
police,	i.e.	uniformed	police	stations	with	several	detectives	at	most,	report	to	the	Ministry	







                                                
18 Source: Ministry of Interior-effectifs de police 2011 
19 14th of March, 2009 
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extended,	 since	 each	 and	 every	 national	 police	 officer	 within	 the	 ‘petite	 couronne’	 now	
reports	to	him,	a	sum	total	of	26,000	police	officers.20	This	decision	was	taken	without	the	
consultation	of	any	mayor,	neither	in	Paris	nor	in	towns	included	into	the	new	system.	It	was	
an	 agreement	 between	 the	Ministry	 of	 Home	 Affairs	 and	 the	 Prefect	 of	 Police.	 The	 new	




(the	 crowd	 control	 units	 of	 the	 gendarmerie),	 which	may	 however	 occasionally	 report	 to	




implement	 a	 community	 policing	 strategy	 within	 the	 French	 National	 Police	 Force	
(Mouhanna,	 2011).	 This	 decision	 has	 been	 taken	 without	 any	 local	 debate.	 Like	 the	
implementation	 of	 community	 policing	 in	 Paris	 in	 1999,	 the	 change	was	 decided	 amongst	
high	level	civil	servants	(Monjardet	et	Mouhanna,	2005).	This	strategy	has	a	huge	influence	
on	the	implementation	of	the	philosophy	of	community	oriented	policing	in	France	&	Paris.	
It	means	 that	 for	example	 the	police	officers	working	 for	 the	French	National	Police	Force	
are	focussed	on	law	and	order	or	zero	tolerance	strategies	and	are	not	at	all	involved	in	any	
kind	 of	 prevention.	 They	 abandon	 what	 they	 call	 “inconvenient”	 missions	 such	 as	 being	
present	at	schools’	doors	or	participating	in	sports	meetings	with	teenagers.	As	a	result,	the	
local	authorities	in	Paris	(and	other	French	cities),	experiment	with	‘new’	forms	of	policing.	It	





The	emergence	or	development	of	municipal	 police	 forces	 and	other	public	
uniformed	surveillance	agencies	in	Paris	
	





a	 pressing	 issue	 but	 feelings	 of	 insecurity	 are	 very	 high,	 have	 long	 since	 opted	 for	 strong	
police	 staffing.	New	recruits	 came	as	an	addition	 to	existing	national	police	 forces.	Hence,	
377	 municipal	 police	 forces,	 with	 huge	 discrepancies	 in	 size,	 cover	 407	 out	 of	 1,280	
communes	 in	 the	 Ile-de-France	 region,	 and	 75%	 of	 the	 population	 (Le	 Goff,	 2009).	
Nevertheless,	200	of	them	comprise	less	than	5	police	officers.	Weaponry	and	assignments	
vary	from	one	place	to	another.	Other	city	councils,	however,	some	of	them	among	the	most	
impacted	 by	 insecurity	 or	 affected	 by	 the	 riots	 of	 2005,	 refuse	 such	 policies,	 arguing	 that	
they	cannot	afford	them21	or	 that	 they	will	not	 take	responsibility	 for	what	 is	essentially	a	
                                                
20 Source: Prefecture of Police-2010. Today, the number of police officers depending from the PP is 30 000.  
21 The average estimated cost of a municipal police force is € 25 per capita (Source: Le GOFF-IAU) 
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mission	 of	 the	 State,	 on	 grounds	 of	 republican	 fairness.	 Some	 mayors	 don’t	 want	 to	 be	






Communist	 party,	 tend	 to	 be	 less	 committed	 in	 this	 trend,	 in	 the	 greater	 Paris	 area	 as	 in	
many	others,	the	right-left	chasm	does	not	mean	much	when	it	comes	to	security	(Ferret	&	
Mouhanna,	 2005).	 Thus,	 the	 decision	 of	 opting	 for	 municipal	 police	 is	 based	 on	 several	








This	 topic,	however,	 failed	 to	draw	consensus	 for	quite	a	while,	as	evidenced	by	 the	2001	
city	 council	 election	 campaign	 debates.	 The	 then	 mayor,	 fearing	 defeat	 (indeed	 he	 lost	
against	 the	 left),	 was	 actively	 promoting	 the	 idea	 of	 such	 a	 force.	 This	 strategy	 was	
consistent	with	 the	 security	 themes	 that	were	 being	 pushed	 to	 the	 fore	 at	 national	 level	
during	this	campaign.	Although	this	campaign	for	a	municipal	police	force	ultimately	failed,	
the	 city	 council	developed	 its	own	operation,	which	 supplemented	 the	Prefecture’s	 rather	
than	competing	with	 them.	The	city	 council	 campaign	of	2014	 showed	no	 real	differences	
between	left	and	right	parties	as	far	as	a	local	police	force	is	concerned.	
	
Little	 by	 little,	 the	Direction	 de	 la	 Prévention	 et	 de	 la	 Protection	 [DPP],	 depending	 on	 the	
mayor,	 increasingly	 appeared	 as	 an	 entity	 which,	 however	 embryonic,	 might	 eventually	
replace	the	Prefecture,	should	the	mayor	change	track.	For	now,	in	addition	to	headquarters	
exploiting	 growing	 numbers	 of	 CCTV	 cameras,	 the	 DPP	 employs	 1,313	 surveillance	 and	
protection	 agents,23	 mainly	 entrusted	 with	 the	 protection	 of	 municipal	 facilities	 and	
patrolling	 capacities.	 These	 are	 low	 figures	 indeed	 if	 compared	 to	 the	 staffing	 of	 national	
police,	 however	 other	 city	 staff	 do	 perform	 security-related	 assignments.	 Some	 of	 these	





Police,	 it	 also	 directly	 pays	 the	 salaries	 of	 the	 2,000	 Paris	Agents	 de	 Surveillance	 [ASP],	 a	
unique	body	 in	France,	which	 is	 in	charge	of	 traffic	and	parking	policing	 in	 the	capital	city.	
These	 officers	 are	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 national	 police	 stations	 (police	
commissariats).	 However,	 it	 is	 entirely	 conceivable	 that	 they	 will	 be	 transferred	 to	 a	
municipal	force,	even	though	the	limitations	of	training	do	not	enable	them	to	substitute	for	
                                                
22 It is expected that the new Socialist Mayor Anne Hildago, who took over from Bertrand Delanoë in April 
2014, will build on his main ideas in relation to security policy.  







It	 is	 clear	 that	 within	 the	 city	 of	 Paris	 security	 matters	 are	 driven	 by	 politics	 and	 not	 by	
economic	considerations.	There	are	three	important	players.	The	State,	which	remains	eager	
to	keep	 the	upper	hand	on	 security	and	public	order	 in	 the	 capital.	 Secondly,	 the	prefect,	
who	 remains	 extremely	 autonomous,	 even	 towards	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Interior.	 Thirdly	 the	








very	 sensitive	 areas	 in	 Paris,	 the	 so	 called	 “correspondants	 de	 nuit”	 are	working	 between	
four	p.m.	and	midnight	(de	Maillard,	2013).	These	units	were	created	in	2002	and	120	agents	
are	 now	 deployed	 in	 11	 areas.	 They	 are	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 homeless,	 control	 of	 public	























One	 of	 the	 major	 emerging	 players	 in	 terms	 of	 volume	 these	 last	 few	 years	 is	 the	
‘Groupement	parisien	inter-bailleurs	de	surveillance’24	(GPIS).	This	45	patrol,	115	man	force,	
                                                
24 Paris inter-lessors surveillance group 
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created	in	2004	upon	the	initiative	of	9	social	housing	lessors,	carries	out	night	patrols	in	the	




same	 time,	 they	 are	 quite	 happy	 to	 take	 delivery	 of	 GPIS’	 arrestees,	which	 improve	 their	
success	 statistics	 without	 exposing	 them	 to	 street	 hazards.	 However,	 the	 public	 versus	
private	 sector	 clash	 remains	quite	 limited	 in	 this	 instance,	 since	half	 the	budget	of	GPIS	 is	
funded	by	 the	Paris	city	council,	while	 the	other	half	 is	provided	by	social	housing	 lessors,	
many	of	which	belong	 to	 the	public	 sector.	Hence,	 it	 is	 less	a	matter	of	privatisation	 than	
creeping	municipalisation	of	public	security.	
Other	organisations	too	have	decided	to	create	their	own	security	forces,	which	exist	next	to	
the	 units	 of	 the	National	 police	 doing	 the	 same	 job.	 For	 example,	 the	 two	 transportation	
services,	the	Regie	Autonome	des	Transports	Parisiens	(RATP)	for	the	metro	and	busses	and	
the	 Société	 Nationale	 des	 Chemins	 de	 fer	 Français	 (SNCF)	 for	 the	 trains,	 have	 developed	
units	 in	 order	 to	 fight	 against	 crime	 and	 fear	 of	 crime	 inside	 their	 buildings	 and	 vehicles.	
Although	a	special	branch	of	the	Police	Nationale-préfecture	de	police	de	Paris	is	dedicated	






to	 transform	 its	 guards,	 who	 were	 plain	 clothes	 agents,	 in	 an	 uniformed	 force	 called	
Surveillance	générale	 (Suge).	 Suge	 consists	of	 2800	agents,	 among	 them	1400	 in	 the	Paris	
metropolitan	 area.	 Like	 the	municipal	 police	 forces,	 the	members	 of	GPSR	 and	 Suge	have	
limited	 powers.	 They	 can	 arrest	 people	 doing	 a	 crime	 or	 refusing	 to	 pay	 their	 travelling	
ticket,	but	they	have	to	refer	as	soon	as	possible	to	a	National	Police	officer,	who	is	the	only	
one	who	has	the	right	to	build	a	criminal	case	and	to	send	it	to	the	prosecutor’s	office.		
In	 Paris	 (and	 France)	 the	 privatisation	 of	 security	 appears	 to	 be	 mainstream.	 Almost	 all	
commercial	centres	have	their	security	service.	Their	agents	are	mostly	oriented	towards	the	
prevention	of	shoplifting.	When	they	arrest	a	thief,	they	are	authorized	by	the	prosecutor	to	
impose	 a	 fine.	 In	 the	 biggest	 commercial	 centres,	 the	 private	 companies	 agents	 are	
patrolling	 in	 the	 alleys,	 looking	 for	 pickpockets	 but	 also	 paying	 attention	 to	 every	 kind	 of	
“trouble”.	 They	 focus	 especially	 on	 group	 of	 youngsters,	 who	 are	 perceived	 to	 frighten	
“honest	 citizens”.	Many	 of	 these	 private	 agents	 belong	 to	 ethnic	minorities	 and/or	 live	 in	
poor	areas	but	they	contribute	to	the	protection	of	“the	temple	of	consumption”.	Not	very	
well	 paid,	 these	agents	 tend	 to	 replace	 the	police	officers	 in	many	places.	At	 the	national	
level,	 it	 is	 said	 that	 the	number	of	private	agents	 is	 around	200	000,	an	equivalent	 to	 the	
number	of	public	officers	in	the	field	of	security.	
This	 in	 no	 way	 rules	 out	 the	 possibility	 of	 seeing	 other	 forms	 of	 private	 security	 gather	
momentum.	 However,	 this	 would	 have	 more	 to	 do	 with	 hybridisation	 than	 competition,	
given	the	numerous	links	between	the	public	and	the	private	sector.	For	example,	at	night,	
                                                
25 Source: Paris city council-2012 
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more	and	more	bars	prefer	self-regulation	and	provide	their	own	guards	in	order	to	prevent	









As	 the	 capital	 city	of	 a	 state	 that	 remains	extremely	 centralised	–	especially	 in	 its	policing	
and	security	policies	–	and	given	 its	political,	economic,	and	demographic	prominence,	the	
Paris	metropolitan	area	stands	out	as	the	most	developed	example	of	centralisation	and	the	
State’s	 wish	 to	 control	 its	 citizens.	 The	 political-administrative	 context	 of	 policing	 Paris	
generated	a	Police	Prefect	that	can	be	considered	as	the	almighty	in	the	field	of	security.	A	
strong	 National	 Police	 Force	 suppresses	 the	 development	 of	 municipal	 police	 forces.	
Nevertheless,	 other	 public	 uniformed	 surveillance	 agencies	 are	 present	 in	 this	metropolis.	







In	 Paris,	 organized	 neighbourhood	 watch	 seems	 not	 to	 be	 welcomed.	 The	 self-organized	
Neighbourhood	watch	operations	 that	were	built	 in	 some	area	–for	 example	 in	 Stalingrad	
place	at	the	beginning	of	2000-	were	not	sustained	neither	by	the	Prefecture	nor	by	the	city	
council.	 All	 this	 kind	 of	 initiatives	 in	 France	 have	 to	 be	 built	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	
Police	Nationale	and	the	‘watchers’	have	to	be	informants	for	the	police	forces.	Otherwise,	







can	be	no	more	 than	 ‘informants’	 for	 the	police	or	 victims	 that	must	 be	protected.	 Some	
police	 officers	 call	 the	 Parisians	 “welfare	 recipients”	 or	 potentially	 dangerous	 people	who	
have	 to	 be	 controlled	 and	managed.	 They	 are	 never	 considered	 as	 partners	 in	 building	 a	
security	strategy	for	Paris.		
On	the	other	hand	citizens	in	Paris	tend	to	feel	very	comfortable	with	this	situation.	They	are	
not	 claiming	 any	 power	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 police	 priorities.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 citizens	
accept	 the	 heavy	 presence	 of	 public	 police	 officers	 whose	 image	 is	 the	 protection	 of	 the	
State	 and	 the	 Nation	 (Mouhanna,	 2011).	 It	 is	 an	 example	 of	 what	 has	 been	 called	 the	
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